1 Privatization of a part of social security might in practice be accompanied by an increase in national debt, the latter being used to finance benefits of the currently elderly during the transition to a funded system. Such a transition would, in a sense, merely convert implicit government liabilities for social security benefits under the present system into explicit government debt. This paper assumes that privatization would not work that way -that temporary taxes would provide the means of compensating elderly beneficiaries during the transition to a funded system. This seems to be the conventional interpretation of "privatizing social security" (e.g., Feldstein [1998] ). families requires careful consideration. At this point, this paper's analysis suggests distinct outcomes: with calibrated parameter values, the closed-economy steady-state equilibrium predicted effects of reducing the size of the unfunded social security system or of the national debt are modest -with the equilibrium stock of physical capital changing only a small amount.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 1 reviews the basic frameworks and hybrid model graphically. Section 2 briefly considers existing empirical evidence. Section 3 examines the U.S. distribution of wealth. Section 4 turns to the distribution of earnings. Section 5 considers how to model the U.S. Federal estate tax -a crucial issue in our calibration. Section 6 presents the equations of this paper's model. Section 7 returns to estate taxation. Section 8 calibrates the hybrid model's parameters. Section 9 presents policy simulation results. Section 10 concludes.
A Graphical Overview
This section characterizes the two basic existing frameworks of the introduction in terms of a common diagram. Then it shows the graph which this paper's new model produces.
The overlapping-generations model emphasizes the utility-maximizing behavior of finite-lived individual households. Since a typical cycle of life ends with a period of retirement, the model suggests that a household will save in youth and middle age, and dissave in old age. The framework can also encompass saving to meet lifetime contingencies, such as spells of unemployment. And, if annuities markets are incomplete, there can be unintentional bequests. Figure 1 illustrates a derivation of the model's long-run equilibrium. For simplicity, omit, for this section, growth and depreciation of capital. Let K be the economy's steadystate stock of physical capital and L the labor supply. Let the latter be inelastic. Suppose there is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function, so that long-run GDP is K α ·L 1−α , with α ∈ (0, 1). Then with competitive behavior in the production sector, the ratio of factor shares is constant. Specifically, if w is the steady-state wage and r the steady-state interest rate, r · K/[w · L] = a constant. Moving r to the right-hand side of the equation, one then has a hyperbolic relation between K/[w · L] and r. That is Figure 1 's "demand for capital" curve. At each r one can sum the net worth, in wage units, of households of every age. When preference orderings are homothetic, this is a particularly simple exercise. This fixes Figure 1 's "supply of financing" curve. The supply curve may be rising or falling because increases in the interest rate lead to complex combinations of income and substitution effects. In the very simple case of logarithmic preferences, two-period lives, and inelastic labor supply of one unit in youth and 0 in old age, for example, the curve will be vertical. Assuming no national debt, an intersection of the demand and supply curves determines a steady-state equilibrium.
2 At an intersection, the amount of wealth households are willing to hold in their portfolios is just sufficient to finance the economy's stock of physical capital.
See figures at end of manuscript Figure 1 moves from E to E . In the illustration, taxes necessary to cover interest on the debt reduce household saving (and consumption), shifting the aggregate supply curve to the left. In the end, the interest rate rises, implying the capital-to-labor ratio falls. Results depend, of course, on the exact shape of the supply curve (and the nature of the tax system). An unfunded social security system tends to shift the supply curve to the left as well: taxes in working years tend to reduce households' capacity to save; anticipated retirement benefits reduce each household's need to save. Again, the effect tends to be a rise in the long-run equilibrium interest rate and a corresponding reduction in the steady-state capital-to-labor ratio.
See figures at end of manuscript In the second basic framework, the representative agent model, the unit of private decision making is an infinite-lived dynasty. In the simplest setup, all dynasties are identical and lack life cycles. Given a steady-state equilibrium for the economy as a whole, without cycles of life the behavior of individual dynasties is stationary. Dynasties smooth their consumption across time periods -motivated by the concavity of their utility function. For an aggregative steady state, the equilibrium interest rate must be such that each dynasty desires at each date to consume its labor earnings plus the interest on its assets. Then the principal of each dynasty's wealth remains intact, allowing equal consumption in the future.
Point E in Figure 3 identifies the steady-state equilibrium of a representative agent model. The "demand curve" is exactly as in Figure 1 . The "supply of financing curve" is now horizontal because, as outlined above, in a steady state each dynasty acts to preserve its net worth, regardless of the latter's magnitude. Another way of understanding this is to note that if c t is a dynasty's time-t consumption, r is the steady-state interest rate, β is the dynasty's subject discount factor, and u(c t ) is its flow of utility, first-order conditions for dynastic utility maximization imply u (c t ) = (1 + r) · β · u (c t+1 ).
(
In a stationary steady state, c t+1 = c t ; hence, the steady-state interest rate depends only on preference parameters -i.e.,
(1 + r) · β = 1 (2) determines r. Turning to policy, government debt does not influence the steady-state interest rate if lump-sum taxes finance debt service -because (2) is unaffected. Hence, government debt does not affect the steady-state capital stock. As in Figure 2 , the equilibrium supply of financing must exceed the demand for K by D; however, the horizontal supply curve now means the economy attains an equilibrium with D > 0 at E , with exactly the same r as in Figure 3 . Similarly, an unfunded social security system does not affect r or K. The advent of such a system increases the present value of each dynasty's benefits and taxes equally, leaving its consumption choices, and willingness to hold wealth, the same. In the end, changes in social security do not shift either the demand or supply curve.
See figures at end of manuscript The present paper constructs a model with both life-cycle saving and dynastic elements: each household has a finite life span and a life-cycle of earnings, and each household cares about the lifetime utility of its descendants as well as itself and may wish to leave an estate (or make inter vivos gifts). To make the model more realistic, and more comparable to data, this paper assumes an exogenous distribution of earning abilities within each birth cohort. It also assumes that intergenerational transfers must be nonnegative.
3 Then in a steady-state equilibrium, households with high earnings (and/or high inheritances) choose to share with their descendants through gifts and bequests, whereas households with limited resources compared to the likely outcome for their descendants move to zero-transfer "corner solutions." The latter households behave as in a purely life-cycle framework. Figure 5 presents a picture. The "demand curve" is as in Figure 1 . The "supply of financing curve" of Figure 1 's purely life-cycle model is the dotted graph. In the hybrid model, very prosperous households also have estate-motivated wealth accumulation, so the new supply curve is the solid graph shifted to the right from the dotted one. At higher and higher (long-run) values of r, intergenerational transfers become more and more attractive. Eventually they are so prevalent that dynasties essentially become infinite lived -the number of generations before a zero transfer in the dynasty of a currently prosperous household becomes very large, and such households behave much like the representative agents of Barro. That generates Figure 5 's horizontal asymptote.
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See figures at end of manuscript Figure 5 : The demand and supply of financing in the hybrid model 3 For a discussion of two-sided altruism, see, for example, Laitner [1997] . 4 See the more mathematical discussion below.
As Figure 5 suggests, the hybrid model can generate, if the equilibrium is at F , policy results resembling the overlapping generations model. In contrast, if the equilibrium is at E, long-run results resembling the representative agent framework will emerge. This paper seeks to calibrate the hybrid model to see which region along Figure 5 's supply curve is the most relevant from an empirical standpoint.
Background
Empirical evidence to date has not been especially kind to either basic model. This section briefly reviews several strands of that literature (see also Laitner [1997] ).
Existing work calls into question whether life-cycle saving alone can explain all of U.S. aggregate net worth. Kotlikoff and Summers [1981] (see also Kotlikoff [1988] and Modigliani [1988] ) suggest bequest-motivated saving accounts for 80 percent or more of the aggregate total. Modigliani [1986] , in contrast, suggests that bequests account for 20-30 percent of overall net worth, with life-cycle saving explaining the preponderance. See also Carroll and Summers [1991] . Calibrated simulations based exclusively on life-cycle saving frequently seem to have difficulty matching aggregate U.S. wealth as well (e.g., Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987] and Mariger [1986] ). A condition of the present paper's calibrations is that they match the 1995 empirical aggregate ratio (
Explaining the shape of the empirical wealth distribution is another issue. The U.S. distribution of wealth is extremely concentrated (e.g., Wolff [1996a] ), with the top 5 percent of wealth holders having at least one-half of all net worth. Many analyses suggest that life-cycle saving alone cannot explain the high share held by a small fraction of households (e.g., Huggett [1996] ).
5 Although other work questions whether models with bequests can go much further in this regard (e.g., Blinder [1974] , Davies [1982] , Laitner [2000b] ), the present paper suggests that with very careful calibration, our hybrid model can do much better.
If the life-cycle model by itself does not seem entirely consistent with empirical evidence, the same can certainly be said of the representative agent model. Hurd [1987] posits that if bequest behavior is important, it should be most strongly evident among households with children. However, his data from the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey fails to show any difference between childless and other households. Laitner and Juster [1996] examine the net worth of elderly couples in the TIAA-CREF pension system. A model of intentional bequests implies that parent net worth should vary positively with parent lifetime earnings, but negatively with the earning power of the parents' children. For a subsample reporting that leaving an estate is a high priority, the sign predictions are borne out; for parents not caring about estates, the coefficient on children's earnings is not significant. Nevertheless, Laitner and Juster are unable to predict which parents will report that leaving an estate is important for them. Altonji et al. [1997] use Panel Study on Income Dynamics data on inter vivos gifts to look for the same relation between gift amount and parent earnings, and gift amount and recipient earnings. The sign pattern is again evident. However, the authors show that according to representative agent theory, their regression coefficient on parent resources minus the coefficient of recipient resources should, in fact, be 1. The latter is not borne out: the estimated difference in the coefficients is an order of magnitude less than 1. Laitner and Ohlsson [2001] examine inheritances in the same data set. Although they employ a somewhat different regression specification, their outcomes are the same: estimated coefficients have the sign pattern which the representative agent model predicts, but the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are much too small.
In the end, empirical evidence provides at most mixed support for either basic framework. A combined model should, of course, do better. It is also apparent from distributional data that the accumulation behavior of the richest 1-5 percent of U.S. households is enormously important in explaining aggregative national wealth.
Net Worth Data
This paper uses data on household net worth from the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances to assess our calibrations (see Section 9) . 6 This section briefly discusses the data and then proposes a sequence of modifications to it. The first steps attempt to enhance the interpretability of the data; the second set of steps derives a subset which is convenient for this paper's analysis.
The 1995 SCF has 4988 variables for 4299 households (see Kennickell et al. [1997] ). The 4299 households include a random "area probability" sample of 2781 and a so-called "list" sample of 1518. The "list sample" comes from a tax file of wealthy households. Kennickell [1998, table 1] details household response rates, which vary from about 70 percent for the area probability sample, to 30-45 percent for the lowest 5 of 7 stratums of the list sample, 24 percent for the sixth stratum of the list sample, and 13 percent for the seventh stratum. Item nonresponse is another concern, and the SCF makes elaborate efforts to obtain ranges from reluctant respondents and to impute missing values. 7 The SCF weights mimic the U.S. population as a whole. According to the survey, 1995 aggregate household net worth is $21.04 trillion. For comparison, net worth in our calibrations below -the total of the 1995 U.S. physical capital stock, business inventories, and national debt -is $18.4 trillion. Notice that except for vehicles, the SCF does not measure consumer durables.
Column 1 of Table 1 presents summary statistics for the unadjusted data. Average net worth per household is $212,000; median net worth is $57,000. The high concentration of the distribution's upper tail is apparent: the top 1% of wealth holders have 35% of the household sector's net worth. 6 The internet site is www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/95/scf95home.html for the data and codebook. Our net worth variable follows from the SAS algorithm in the codebook.
7 Kennickell [1997, table 1] shows the response rate (of those reporting "any" for a given category) varies, for example, from 94% on credit card balances, to 62% on value of own business, to 64% on value of stock, to 80% on checking account balance, etc. In the data set, each household has 5 rows, with one column for every variable. The rows present varying imputations. Our analysis uses the weights X42001, as described in the codebook, divided by 5 to correct for multiple imputations. . The latter allows us to compute a percentage of net worth in other real estate, business, other business, and directly held stock for households in six net-worth categories (i.e., 0-250K, 250-500K, 500-1000K, 1-5M, 5-10M, 10M+) and then to estimate the share of unrealized capital gains per cell. (We omit capital gains on own residence, since most of these are tax exempt.) We impute a 20% tax on unrealized gains. Column 2 displays net-of-accrued-capital-gains-tax wealth. 8 The share of the top 1 percent of wealth holders falls by 1.4% from column 1 to 2.
Other corrections in the same vein, slated for future drafts, involve pensions. The SCF net worth data include defined contribution pension accounts but omit the capitalized value of defined benefit pension rights and the capitalized value of all post-retirement pension flows. (The IRS taxes pension (and most individual retirement account) payouts as ordinary income, so pension wealth also needs a tax liability adjustment.) As stated, it is also the case that the Survey of Consumer Finances omits most consumer durables. It seems likely that a careful treatment of pensions and a correction for missing consumer durables will further reduce the concentration of net worth.
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Our second category of adjustments anticipate simplifications in our theoretical model. First, the model assumes that bankruptcy laws prevent households from borrowing themselves into a state of negative net worth. About 7 percent of column-1 households have negative net worth. Column 3, Table 1 , raises negative amounts to zero. This step turns out to make little difference, especially to the shares of the top 1-10 percent. Second, in the model couples head all households, whereas in the data some heads are singles, widows, etc. For all households which are not couples or partners, column 4 doubles net worth and halves the sample weight. (In effect, column 4 marries singles to others in exactly the same economic circumstance as themselves, simultaneously reducing the number of households to match the implied consolidation.) The concentration of wealth drops because singles often have fewer resources; the share of the top 1 percent falls 1.1%. Third, since our theoretical model determines the distribution of net worth for households with heads age 22-73, column 5 of Table 1 selects the same age range from the data.
The changes in mean wealth from column 1 to 5 primarily reflect differences in the definition of a household. Accordingly, this paper's concern focuses on the ability of the model of Section 6 (i) to explain aggregate wealth accumulation and (ii) to reproduce the shape of the wealth distribution in column 5.
The Distribution of Earnings
The 1995 SCF collects data on household earnings for 1994. 10 The survey measures wages and salaries, variable X5702, and business income, variable X5704. Since our theoretical model assumes a constant returns to scale aggregate production function with capital's share α = .3251, we define a "household's earnings" as X5702 + (1 − α) · X5704. Column 1 of Table 2 summarizes the constructed variable. This section processes it further, and then uses it to develop a parametric description of the distribution of earnings.
Column 2, Table 2 , adjusts for marital status. As in the case of wealth, we double the earnings of singles, and halve their weight -in effect marrying singles to spouses with identical earning ability.
Our theoretical model assumes that each working-age household inelastically supplies labor and earns at time t
where W t is the wage; e s is age-s human capital from experience; and, z j is household j's life-long earning ability (which differs among households). The empirical model of this section adds an iid, family specific, yearly shock jt , so that earnings are
Turning to the data, we calculate mean earnings for 5-year age groups (i.e., 20-24, 25-29, etc.); impute the mean to the median age for the group; and, from the means, linearly interpolate W t · e s all ages s. Dividing each household's earnings by the interpolated value W t · e s yields our observations of z j · jt . Section 6's model requires an earnings distribution with a compact support; hence, we drop households with z j · jt below .2 or above 10,000.
For consistency with the model, we also drop observations having s < 22 or s > 65. Column 3, Table 2 , summarizes remaining observations. Existing empirical work often treats ln(z j ) and ln( jt ) as independent normal random variables. Estimates from panel data then imply roughly equal variances (see, for example, King and Dicks-Mireaux [1982] ). As the variance of the log of z j · jt for column 2's data is .4187, this paper assumes
Solon [1992] estimates an intergenerational model
where z j is the lifetime earning ability of the son of a household with ability z j , ζ and µ are parameters, and η j ∼ normal(0, σ 2 η ). This paper adopts Solon's estimate ζ = .45. To allow thicker tails for the earnings distribution, this paper assumes a t distribution for η, 10 Although the SCF asks about current pay rates, hours, etc., as well, the latter data does not include weeks worked during the year; hence, this paper employs only the 1994 information. the latter being a normal(0, σ 2 η ) random variable divided by an independent χ 2 variable with n degrees of freedom. For n → ∞, of course, η is lognormal. For finite n, its density is
We proceed as follows. Fix an n. This paper truncates the support of η to
We set up a 100-element grid, say, Z 1 ,...,Z 100 , linear in logs, over the support of the random variablez; set up a 100 × 100 matrix M with
and, assuming trapezoidal integration, determine the vector N ≡ (N 1 , ..., N 100 ) such that
.., 100, and
Thus, N numerically approximates the stationary density function forz. For our given n, we choose (µ, σ η ) so that the mean of the latter density is 1 and the variance of ln(z) is one-half the variance of the log of the observations from column 3. Finally, we derive summary statistics for the product of ourz and the independent lognormal˜ specified in (2) .
Column 4, Table 2 , presents summary statistics for n = 100, whenz is virtually lognormal. The concentration at the upper end of the distribution is far lower than column 3's data.
Calculations show that n = 3 goes too far in the other direction, whereas n = 4 still leaves the upper tail's concentration too low. Column 5 presents results for n = 3.8192, this paper's choice, the n which minimizes the χ 2 test statistic derived from the frequencies implicit in column 2 and the new summary.
11 For this n, the calculations above imply µ = −.1024 and σ η = .3032.
Federal Gift and Estate Taxes
Federal gift and estate tax revenues play a major role in the calibrations below. In general, the small aggregate collections from the existing tax are rather puzzling given the high nominal statutory rates and the concentration of wealth evident in Section 3. This section examines in detail how one might specify the estate tax for simulations.
Column 1 of Table 3 lists 1995 federal estate tax rates. 12 The federal gift tax uses the same schedule; however, the gift tax applies only to net of tax transfer amountsi.e., for a flat tax t and gross transfer x, the estate tax liability would be t · x, but the gift tax liability would be t · x/(1 + t). In 1995, each taxpayer had a lifetime credit of $192,800 for combined gift and estate taxes; there were unlimited marital and charitable deductions; and, each year a taxpayer could exclude any number of gifts of $10,000 or less to separate individuals. Two important points are (i) despite the high rates in Table 3 , 1995 aggregate gift and estate tax collections were only $17.8 billion (a figure which sums $14.8 billion of federal revenues -see the Economic Report of the President [1999] -with $3.0 billion credited for state death duties -see Eller [1997] ), and (ii) although gift tax rates are noticeably more attractive for donors, gift tax collections are typically an order of magnitude less than revenues from estates. Section 7 returns to the second point. Here we examine the first, attempting to derive for our numerical analysis a specification of the federal estate tax system which is consistent with Table 1 's distribution of wealth.
The upper section of Table 4 presents 1995 tax data on large estates (gross estate less debts), marital deductions, and charitable deductions. The figures come from Eller [1997] . We construct the second section from the SCF data of column 1, Table 1 , according to the steps below. Our goal is to determine what degree of tax avoidance makes the SCF and tax data consistent with one another.
To measure tax avoidance, captured by parameter θ f below, we need to estimate marital and charitable deductions. First, consider single households in the SCF. If N W j is SCF net worth for household j, if ω j the household's SCF sample weight, and if p j is the probability of death this year for the household head's age and sex from a standard mortality table, one can construct analogues of the variables of columns 1, 2, 4, and 6 from the top of table 4 from p j · ω j times, respectively,
where θ c is the fraction of the estate going to charity and θ f is the fraction of taxable wealth actually reported on a decedent's estate tax form. "Estate planning" presumably renders θ f < 1. Looking at Eller's data, we assume 
for a first decedent's estate. To cover the chance that both spouses die the same year, one must add
to pick up the second spouse's estate. We choose the θ's to minimize the sum of squared deviations between columns 1, 2, 4, and 6, for rows 1-6, of the upper and lower segments of Table 3 's brackets, compute the marginal tax rate using our definition of taxable estate. Column 2, Table 3 , presents the rates. Column 3 presents the rates our simulations below actually employ. The minimum gross estate for any tax due is $1,038,000; the minimum in the simulations is $1,000,000.
Finally, an estate escapes income taxation on capital gains unrealized during the decedent's life: an executor raises all assets to market value before calculating the estate tax liability, but the capital gains from the first step are exempt from income taxation. As in Section 1, compute the capital gain's tax liability using Poterba and Weisbenner [2000] . Column 4, Table 3 , presents marginal estate tax rates corrected both as in column 2 and for the saving in capital gain taxes. Column 5 presents the rounded rates which the simulations use.
In our simulations, households use the "perceived marginal tax rates" of column 6 to guide their behavior. However, each simulation simultaneously computes the estate tax liability from a government revenue standpoint from the "effective marginal tax rate" of column 4. In our calibration process, we compare total government revenues based on column 4 with the 1995 U.S. aggregate collections of $17.8 billion (despite the fact that households care only about column 6).
Theoretical Model
This paper's theoretical model has three distinctive elements. First, households are "altruistic" in the sense of caring about the utility of their grown-up descendants. Because of this, a household may choose to make inter vivos gifts or bequests to its descendants. Second, within each birth cohort there is an exogenous distribution of earning abilities. Third, households cannot have negative net worth at any point in their lives (perhaps because bankruptcy laws stop financial institutions from making loans without collateral); similarly, intergenerational transfers must be nonnegative (so that parents cannot extract old age support from reluctant children through negative gifts and bequests). These elements lead to a distribution of intergenerational transfers and, ultimately, a distribution of wealth. In particular, a high-earning-ability parent with a low-earning-ability child will tend to want to make an inter vivos gift or bequest, but a low-earning-ability parent with a high-earning-ability child will not. Borrowing constraints may also lead to transfers: even parents who do not intend to make bequests at death may choose to make inter vivos gifts to their children, say, when the latter are in their twenties.
The basic framework is similar to Laitner [1992] , although in contrast to the latter this paper incorporates estate taxes, assumes earning abilities are heritable within family lines, and allows limited altruism in the sense that a parent caring about his grown children may, in his calculations, weight their lifetime utility less heavily than his own. In contrast to Laitner [2000b] , this paper uses the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances for its calibrations and provides a more sophisticated model of estate taxes.
Other comparisons to the existing literature are as follows. In contrast to Becker and Tomes [1979] , Loury [1981] , and many others, the present paper omits special consideration of human capital.
14 In contrast to Davies [1981] , Friedman and Warshawsky [1990] , Abel [1985] , Gokhale et al. [1999] , and others, the present paper assumes that households purchase actuarially fair annuities to offset fully mortality risk; consequently, all bequests in this paper's model are intentional. In contrast to Bernheim and Bagwell [1988] , this paper assumes perfectly assortative mating -adopting the interpretation of Laitner [1991] , who shows that a model of one parent households, each having one child, can mimic the outcomes of a framework in which each set of parents has two children and mating is endogenous. In contrast to Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987] and others, the present paper assumes that households supply labor inelastically; similarly, each surviving household retires at age 65. Presupposing an inelastic labor supply eliminates, of course, potentially interesting implications about the work incentives of heirs (see, for example, Holtz-Eakin et al. [1993] ).
Framework. Time is discrete. The population is stationary. Think of each household as having a single parent and single offspring (see the reference to assortative mating above). The parent is age 22 when a household begins. The parent is 26 when his child is born. When the parent is 48, the child is 22. At that point, the child leaves home to form his own household. The parent works from age 22 through 65 and then retires. No one lives beyond age 87. There is no child mortality. In fact, for simplicity there is no parent mortality until after age 48. The fraction of adults remaining alive at age s is q s .
Labor hours are inelastic. Each adult has an earning ability z, constant throughout his life, and evident from the moment that he starts work. Letting e s be the product of experiential human capital and labor hours, and letting g be one plus the annual rate of labor-augmenting technological progress, an adult of age s and ability z who was born at time t supplies e s · z · g t+s "effective" labor units at age s ≥ 22. This paper focuses on steady-state equilibria in which the wage per effective labor unit, w, the interest rate, r, the income tax rate, τ , and the social security tax rate, τ ss , are constant. One plus the net-of-tax interest factor on annuities for an adult of age s is
Section 4 presented our model for the evolution and stationary distribution ofz. Utility is isoelastic. If an adult has consumption c at age s, his household derives utility flow u(c, s). If his minor child has consumption c k , an adult household derives, at age s, an additional utility flow u k (c k , s). Our analysis sets
with γ < 1. We discuss the relative weights for retirement consumption, υ, and minor children, ω, below. Isoelastic preferences are homothetic, of course, allowing a steadystate equilibrium despite technological progress. Consider a parent aged 48. Let t be the year he was born. Let his utility from remaining lifetime consumption be U old (a 48 , z, t), where his earning ability is z, and his assets for remaining lifetime consumption are a 48 . Then
subject to: 
subject to:
As stated, the model assumes that bankruptcy laws prevent households from borrowing without collateral, giving us the last inequality constraint in (10) . For the sake of simplicity, on the other hand, this paper assumes that such constraints do not bind for older households, making them superfluous in (9) . To incorporate altruism, let V young (a 22 , z, t) be the total utility of a 22-year old altruistic household carrying initial assets a to age 22, having earning ability z, and having birth date t -where "total utility" combines utility from lifetime consumption with empathetic utility from the consumption of one's descendants. Let V old (a 48 , z, z , t) be the total utility of a 48-year old altruistic household which has learned that its grown child has earning ability z . Then letting E[.] be the expected value operator, and letting ξ > 0 be the intergenerational subjective discount factor, we have a pair of Bellman equations
where b 48 is the parent's intergenerational transfer, and T (b 48 , t, z ) is the net-of-transfertax inheritance of the child (which Section 7 shows may depend on the child's earning ability as well as on b). As stated above, we require b 48 ≥ 0, so that parents cannot compel reverse transfers from their children. To preserve homotheticity, we require that estate tax brackets, deductions, and credits growth with factor g over time -in other words,
Similarly,
Given (11)- (12) and isoelastic utility,
One can then deduce
Substituting a for a 22 /g t , a for a 48 /g t , and b for b 48 /g t , the Bellman equations become
Suppose maximization yields φ(a 22 
This paper assumes all families have identical υ, ω, β, and ξ.
There is an aggregate production function
where Q t is GDP, K t is the aggregate stock of physical capital, and E t is the effective labor force. The model omits government capital and consumer durables. K t depreciates at rate δ ∈ (0, 1). Normalizing the size of the time-0 birth cohort to 1 (so that every birth cohort has size 1), and employing the law of large numbers,
The price of output is always 1. Perfect competition implies
The government issues D t one-period bonds with price 1 at time t. Assume
Let SSB t be aggregate social security benefits. Assume the social security system is unfunded; so,
If G t is government spending on goods and services, assume
Leaving out the social security system, in which benefits and taxes contemporaneously balance, the government budget constraint is
where F t (b, z ) is the joint distribution function for parental transfers b to households of age 22 at time t and earning ability z -so that the last term is estate-tax revenues (recall the normalization on cohort populations). This paper assumes public-good consumption does not affect marginal rates of substitution for private consumption.
Households finance all of the physical capital stock and government debt. Let H(z | z) be the distribution function for child earning ability z conditional on parent ability z (recall Section 4). Then when N W t is the aggregate net worth held which the household sector carries from time t to t + 1, the economy's supply and demand for financing balance, using the law of large numbers, if and only if
In "equilibrium" all households maximize their utility and (8)- (25) hold. A "steadystate equilibrium" (SSE) is an equilibrium in which r t and w t are constant all t; in which Q, K, and E grow geometrically with factor g; and, in which the time-t distribution of pairs (b/g t , z) is stationary. The last implies
This paper focuses exclusively on steady-state equilibria.
Existence and Computation of Equilibrium. We can amend Propositions 1-3 of Laitner [1992] in a straightforward manner to establish the existence of a steady-state equilibrium.
The propositions imply that we can compute a steady-state equilibrium as follows. Perfectly competitive behavior on the part of firms and our aggregate production function yield
where K t /E t is stationary in a steady state. Household wealth finances the physical capital stock and the government debt. Combining the two uses of credit,
Line (21) shows D t /Q t is a parameter; thus, (27) yields the "demand" for financing curve in Figure 6 .
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See figures at end of manuscript Figure 6 : The steady-state equilibrium demand and supply of financing Definer from
where τ beq is the maximal marginal tax rate on bequests. Fix any r with r · (1 − τ ) <r, and fix w = 1. We can solve our Bellman equations using successive approximations: set V old,1 (.) = 0; substitute this for V old (.) on the right-hand side of (13), and solve for V young,1 (.); substitute the latter on the right-hand side of (14), and solve for V old,2 (.); etc. This yields convergence at a geometric rate: as j → ∞,
This paper's grid size for numerical calculations is 250 for net worth and 25 for earnings. The grids are evenly spaced in logarithms -except for even division in natural numbers for the lowest wealth values.
Turning to the distribution of inheritances and wealth, for a dynastic parent household born at t, policy function (16) yields
where a 22 is initial net worth in the dynasty's next generation. Lines (3)- (4) imply
where η has a known distribution. Together (29)- (30) determine a Markov process from points (a 22 /g t , z) to Borel sets of points (a 22 /g t+26 , z ) one generation later. In practice, we adjust µ so that the stationary distribution of z has mean 1, and we truncate the distribution of η so that z ∈ [.2, 10, 000]. Then as in Laitner [1992] , there are bounded intervals A and Z with A × Z an invariant set for the Markov process, and there is a unique stationary distribution for the process in this set. In terms of distribution functions (26) , the Markov process induces a mapping, say, J with
Iterating (31) from any starting distribution on A × Z, we have convergence to the unique stationary distribution. Again, our numerical grid in practice is 250 × 25. The stationary distribution and lifetime behavior yield expected net worth per household normalized by average current earnings. Using the law of large numbers, we treat the latter ratio, N W t /(w · E t ), as nonstochastic. 16 This generates the supply curve of Figure 6 . Laitner's [1992] propositions show N W t /(w · E t ) varies continuously with r and has an asymptote at r =r/(1−τ ) as shown in the figure; thus, we must have an intersection of the demand and the supply curves. An intersection determines an equilibrium for the model. There are no steady states above the asymptote -as household net worth is infinite for r ≥r/(1 − τ ).
Timing and Taxes
Dynamic programming determines a given dynasty's desired transfer, say, b 48 = ψ(a 22 , t, z, z ), as in (16) . If the heir faces binding liquidity constraints (see (10) ), the transfer must be made promptly -delays or impediments will invalidate our Bellman equations. If liquidity constraints do not bind, or if a fraction of b 48 suffices to lift them, the timing of remaining transfers is, in mathematical terms, indeterminate. In terms of the model, a parent is then indifferent between completing his transfer at age 48, leaving a fraction of his transfer for his estate at death, making a sequence of gifts over many years, etc. This section considers the timing of transfers in more detail, and presents the resolution of indeterminacy on which our computations are based. Then it turns to the related issue of the specification of estate taxes.
In practice, conflicting forces influence the age at which a parent makes his intergenerational transfer. On the one hand, taxes encourage early transfers -Section 5 notes that tax rates on inter vivos gifts are lower than those on estates. Further, since tax rates are progressive, an early-in-life transfer faces lower taxes than a late-in-life sum with the same present value. On the other hand, a wealthy donor may feel that he can earn a higher rate of return on financial investments than his heirs (e.g., Poterba [1998] ); a parent may value wealth for its own sake (e.g., Kurz [1968] ) or as a means of securing his children's attentions (e.g., Bernheim et al. [1985] ); or, a parent may want to delay in transferring his estate to protect himself against possible strategic behavior on the part of his children (e.g., a parent making a prompt transfer might find that his child consumes the sum quickly and then asks for more help -see Laitner [1997] ). Although presumably many wealthy decedents make inter vivos transfers, data show that taxable estates empirically are an order of magnitude larger than taxable gifts (e.g., Pechman [1987,tab. 8.2] and Poterba [1998,tab.4 
]).
In light of the evidence, this paper's model presumes that parents strongly prefer to hold off on taxable intergenerational transfers until death. Specifically, our computations assume that parents who want to make intergenerational transfers to their children do so through inter vivos gifts when liquidity constraints bind on the children, but that once a parent has transferred enough to (just) lift his child's constraints, the parent saves his remaining transfers for his bequest. We make the following additional assumption purely for the sake of simplicity: if a parent remains alive at age 74 (when his child is 48), we assume that he makes his "bequest" (i.e., his final transfer) then. 17 We must specify federal gift and estate taxes in a way consistent with this timing.
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There are many opportunities for avoiding federal taxes on intergenerational transfers which are only available to living donors. A husband and wife, for instance, can each annually transfer a $10,000 gift to each child, and to the spouse of each child, without incurring any tax liability. Policing lifetime gifts is extremely difficult; thus, parents presumably can shelter their grown children, provide facilities and resources for joint vacations, etc., without, in practice, reporting to the IRS. Transfer pricing provides other options. Suppose, for instance, that a father's labor has annual marginal revenue product of $10 million and his son's marginal revenue product is $1 million. Then the father might agree to work for $8 million with an implicit understanding that his son, employed at the same firm, will earn $3 million.
With such a perspective, this paper assumes zero tax liability on inter vivos gifts. For a net-of-tax transfer x, our analysis of timing determines the present value of inter vivos gifts, say, x 1 , and the actuarial present value of bequests at death, x 2 . (By definition, x 1 + x 2 = x.) For a current-value bequest X 2 , we can determine the current gross bequest, say, Y 2 , consistent with Section 5's "perceived effective" 1995 U.S. tax system (ie, column 6 of Table 3 ). At parent age 48, let the present actuarial value of desired gross bequests Y 2 for all possible ages of death be y 2 . Then for gross transfer x 1 +y 2 at parent age 48, the tax liability is y 2 − x 2 . In particular, for a parent age 48 at time 0, last section's tax function is
Since our calculations for y 2 depend on the way x is split between gifts and bequests, which, in turn, depends on z , the latter must be an argument of T (.). Note also that our treatment assumes parents deduce their potential tax rate realizing that they will apportion their net transfer in accordance with our timing assumption, and that the latter itself, under our treatment, is insensitive to the nominal tax rate. In Section 8's computations, we assume a tax function, say, T 0 (.) of form (11), stored as a 250 × 25 matrix over Section 6's grid for A × Z; we solve the Bellman equation for V young (.) and V old (.) conditional on T 0 (.); deducing the division of possible net transfers between gifts and estates on the basis of these value functions, we construct a new tax function, say, T 1 (.); we solve the Bellman equations for V young (.) and V old (.) conditional on T 1 (.); repeat our steps to derive T 2 (.); etc. Provided we have convergence to a fixed point T (b, 0, z ), i.e.,
T (.) is a usable tax function. (In our computations, convergence is never a problem.)
Calibration
In addition to an estate tax system, described in Sections 5 and 7, and model of earning abilities, described in Section 4, our framework has parameters α, δ, υ, ω, τ ss , g, τ , β, ξ, and γ. We calibrate the first 6 directly from sources described below. We then set τ , β, ξ, and γ to balance the government budget constraint, to match empirical patterns of household consumption growth, to match the U.S. stock of physical capital and government debt, and to match empirical aggregate estate-tax revenues. Finally, we compare our simulated steady-state distribution of wealth with Section 3's 1995 data.
As stated, a household begins with a 22 year old adult; when the adult is 26, he has one child; the child forms his own household when his parent is 48; each person retires at the close of age 65; and, no one dies later than the close of age 87. There is no population growth in our simulations. We simply set our technological progress factor g to 1.01.
Parameters and ratios. Letting 1995 wages and salaries from
We set a proportional tax τ ss on earnings up to the 1995 social security limit ($61,200) so that taxes exactly cover 1995 retirement benefits ($287.0 bil.). Within each birth cohort, social security benefits are progressive: for each cohort, we allocate benefits across our earning groups according to the benefit formula and maximum in U.S. Social Security Administration [1998] .
Using 1995 Federal, state, and local expenditures on goods and services, G t /(w · E t ) = .2765. Taking the 1995 ratio of Federal debt to 1 − α times GDP,
We assume no child mortality, and we assume no adult mortality until age 48. Table 5 presents our figures for q s , which reflect average 1995 mortality rates for U.S. men and women. The implied average life span is 77 years. Column 2 of Table 5 presents our age profile for experiential human capital, taken from 1995 SCF household earnings (as in column 1, Table 2 ). 19 The figures correspond to w · e s in the model. First-order conditions for lifetime optimization imply that an adult will choose υ times as much consumption after retirement, cet. par., as before, and that he will allocate ω times as much consumption to his minor child as to himself. People tend to have lower consumption needs after retirement: a recent TIAA-CREF brochure suggests, for example, that "you'll need 60-90 percent of your current income in retirement, adjusted for inflation, to maintain your standard of living when you retire;" and, a recent Reader's Digest article on retirement planning writes, "Many financial planners say it will take 70 to 80 percent of your current income to maintain your standard of living when you retire." Using the midpoint of these brackets, we set υ = .75. Mariger [1986] estimates that children consume 30% as much as adults. Similarly, Burkhauser et al. [1996] estimate that consumption needs of 4-person relative to 2-person families have a ratio of 1.34-1.42. We set ω = .3.
Lifetime first-order conditions for adult consumption at different ages imply
with equality when the nonnegativity constraint on household net worth does not bind. Tables from the 1984-97 U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey present consumption data for households of different ages. 20 We adjust the treatment of service flows from owner occupied houses. 21 Then we compute the average ratio of consumption at age s + 1 to 19 In order to convert take home pay to total compensation, we multiply SCF wages and salaries by 17.49/12.58 -see Statistical Abstract of the United States [1997,tab.676] . 20 See http://stats.bls.gov.csxhome.htm. 21 The adjustment is as follows. We subtract mortgage payments and repairs to owner occupied houses and scale remaining consumption to NIPA levels for aggregate consumption less housing flows. Then we distribute NIPA housing service flows across ages using proportional housing values given in the survey. See Laitner [2000a] . that at age s for households of ages 30-39 -attempting to avoid ages at which liquidity constraints bind, at which children leave home, and at which retirement begins. The average ratio is 1.0257; hence, we require
Fixing α, δ, υ, ω, τ ss , g, as described above, we are left with τ , β, γ, and ξ. We adjust these until in the simulation (i) the government budget constraint holds, (ii) consumption growth condition (34) holds for unconstrained ages, (iii) aggregate estate tax collections (roughly) equal $17.8 billion, and (iv) the empirical capital stock plus government debt to earnings ratio matches the right-hand side of (25) . (Note that since the empirical ratio capital and debt to earnings and our aggregate production function alone determine the interest rate, in all calibrations r = .069.)
In the calculations, it is easy to compute τ from (24) given our assumptions and requirement that estate-tax revenues equal their empirical counterpart. Given τ , it is also simple to compute β from (34) . For a selection of values of γ, we then iterate on ξ until the right-hand sides of (25) and (27) agree. (A higher ξ leads to higher bequests and, in general, to a greater supply of wealth.) Table 8 presents simulations for different γ values. By far the best match with empirical estate-tax revenues is γ = .7. Notice that a higher γ implies more flexibility on the part of households in dealing with intertemporal consumption differences and a higher tolerance for risk; hence, a higher γ tends to lead to lower bequests. To match the aggregate stock of net worth, a higher γ then requires a higher ξ. In the end, with a higher γ we tend to have widespread intergenerational transfers many of which are small. Given the progressivity of the tax system, this implies lower estate-tax revenues.
Results
Questions of interest are: (a) How well does the simulated distribution of wealth in column 6 of Table 8 match U.S. data? (b) Does the best calibration imply an equilibrium in Figure 5 resembling E or F ? And, (c) What does the model imply about the long-run effect of changes in the U.S. social security system or the level of the national debt? Distribution of Wealth. In comparing column 6 of Table 8 with column 5 of Table 1 , the question is not whether the mean wealth per household of column 5 is borne out in the simulated equilibrium: since the simulated mean reflects the aggregate wealth to earnings ratio, which we calibrate ξ to duplicate, it should roughly correspond to the mean of column 1, Table 1 ; the "adjustments" embodied in column 5 of Table 1 spoil the normalization of the original survey weights, invalidating comparisons of levels with our model. What we do want to consider is how relative measures, such as percentage shares of wealth, line up between column 5, Table 1 , and the simulation.
Before proceeding, note that Table 1 's distribution of wealth is enormously more concentrated than the distribution of earnings in column 3, Table 2 . Using our stationary distribution of earning abilities, our rate of technological progress, and our mortality rates, Table 7 presents the Gini coefficient and quantile shares for the model's distribution of earnings for ages 22-65. 22 Column 5 of Table 1 shows an empirical wealth share of the top 1% of households of 32.0 percent; the share of earnings for the top 1% is only 10.9 percent according to Table 7 . In each of our calibration simulations, life cycle saving alone (at our calibrated gross interest rate) accounts for 64.8% of household wealth. Column 2 of Table 7 shows the stationary distribution of wealth generated solely by life cycle accumulation. The concentration exceeds that of earnings. For example, the share of the top 1% of wealth holders is 16.4 percent, and the Gini coefficient is .71. This is a natural consequence of the facts (i) that life cycle accumulations are zero at age 22 and at death, but quite high near retirement, and (ii) that the replacement ratio for social security benefits is greater for low earners, who consequently save proportionately smaller amounts than higher earners. Nevertheless, inequality arising from life cycle patterns is not nearly sufficient to explain the empirical degree of wealth inequality (see also Huggett [1996] ). Table 8 presents simulations of our complete model for different values of γ. Column 6 is the best simulation from the standpoint of replicating aggregate estate-tax collections.
Comparing it with column 5 of Table 1 , notice that the data show that the top .5% of households own 24.5 percent of U.S. wealth, the top 1% own 32.0 percent, the top 5% own 53.3 percent, and the top 10% own 65.1 percent. For column 6, Table 8 , the top .5% hold 20.3 percent of aggregate net worth, the top 1% own 24.6%, the top 5% own 43.1 percent, and the top 10% own 55.4 percent. Looking at the amount of wealth relative to the mean amount, in the data the bracket for the top .5% begins at 21 times the mean, the bracket for the top 1% begins at 11 times the mean, and the bracket for the top 5% begins at 3 times the mean. In the best simulation, the corresponding multiples are 9.5, 8, and 3.2. The Gini coefficient for the data is .77; for the simulation with γ = .7 it is .74. 
distributed χ 2 with 10 degrees of freedom in a conventional test. The column from Table 8 favored under the metric of minimizing this statistic has γ = .06 -although γ = .7 is very close. (Clearly all of the statistics are huge, so that if the test were valid, we would reject the model.)
In the end, the model does much better in matching the SCF wealth data than lifecycle saving alone. Nevertheless, the model's fit is far from perfect. The model omits many factors -such as the charitable bequests mentioned in Section 5. It is also the case that further processing of the wealth data might reduce its apparent concentration -for example, Section 3 mentions problems with the treatment of pensions and most consumer durables.
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Shape of the Financing Supply Curve. Our discussion of Figure 5 in Section 1 shows that the interest elasticity of the supply of financing at the steady-state equilibrium point can be crucially important for policy results. We solve for elasticities numerically for each value of γ in Table 8 . Table 9 presents elasticities. The demand elasticities are all small and identical; all come from (27) . The supply elasticities, on the other hand, vary greatly. For γ = −2, the supply elasticity is .8. However, in the neighborhood of γ = .7, it is about 11.5. In terms of Figure 5 , evidently our best calibration implies an outcome resembling E rather than F . This leads us to expect that changes in social security policy and national debt will not affect the economy's steady-state interest rate and capital intensivity very much.
Policy Results. Table 10 presents policy simulations. The first column repeats column 6 of Table 8 . The second and third columns cut social security benefits (and taxes) by 50 percent and 90 percent, respectively. The fourth and fifth columns cut the national debt by 50 percent and 90 percent, simultaneously adjusting the income tax τ to preserve the government's budget constraint. The bottom part of the table shows the effect on the economy's long-run interest rate and capital intensivity; the top part shows the outcome for the long-run distribution of net worth. Cuts in social security of x% here roughly correspond to privatization of x% of our current system.
As expected given the very large supply elasticity at γ = .70 in Table 9 , changes in social security corresponding to privatizing -or funding -50 to 90% of the current U.S. system yield miniscule reductions in the steady-state equilibrium interest rate and tiny increases in (K + D)/(w · E).
Looking at the top section of Table 10 , reducing unfunded social security does decrease the inequality of the long-run distribution of wealth. The share of the top 1 percent of wealth holders declines from 24.6 to 22.0 percent if we fund 90% of social security. The share of the top 5 percent drops from 43.1 to 38.1 percent. Intuitively, life-cycle and bequest-motivated saving provide the aggregate supply of financing for the economy. Lifecycle saving tends to be proportional to earnings. Estate-motivated saving, on the other hand, is more unequal: only the most prosperous households engage in it at all (less than half of all households leave bequests at death in column 1 of Table 10 ). It is the latter saving which gives the aggregate supply its great interest elasticity. Reducing unfunded social security increases life-cycle saving. As the equilibrium interest rate accordingly falls, estate saving is strongly affected -falling. Then life-cycle net worth accumulation becomes a larger fraction of the economy's total wealth. Since it is more equal, the long-run distribution of wealth becomes more equal.
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Table 10 also considers reductions in the national debt. As in the case of social security, we are making comparative-static comparisons of steady-state equilibria (this paper's analysis does not compute transition paths between long-run equilibria). The bottom of the table shows the effects on r are small. K + D falls even as r does because D falls.
The top of the table is more surprising, however: wealth inequality actually increases with a smaller national debt. Consider paying down 90% of the national debt. Life-cycle saving does rise in importance, explaining 72 percent of K + D with a lower national debt, but 65% initially. The absolute wealth holdings of, say, the top 1 percent do decline. Nevertheless, apparently the relative importance of remaining estate-motivated saving increases in the lower wealth environment with a smaller national debt. Part of the explanation may be that reducing the debt allows a lower income tax, so that the net of tax interest rate only declines from 5.26% to 5.19% between columns 1 and 5.
Conclusion
This paper studies a model which combines life-cycle and dynastic motives for saving. We calibrate a steady-state equilibrium version of the model using U.S. data on total national wealth, the distribution of wealth among households, and aggregate estate tax revenues. The U.S. distribution of wealth is very concentrated, with the top 5 percent of wealth holders accounting for over half of total net worth. The model is consistent with a high degree of inequality, although it does not match the empirical distribution perfectly.
The most surprising result of our calibration efforts is that the model strongly favors parameter values which yield a very high overall interest elasticity for the supply of financing. The implication is that funding part, or all, of the social security systemas by setting up private lifetime accounts for individual households -would have very little long-run effect on interest rates or the economy's capital intensivity. This does not imply, of course, that the administrative advantages of reform would not be worthwhile. And, this paper's model has an inelastic labor supply, which precludes an analysis of the possible efficiency gains from the less onerous taxes on earnings that a privatized social security system might deliver. Our results do warn, however, that policy analyses based on conventional overlapping generations models may considerably overstate the long-run effect of social security reform on national capital accumulation. -1250  41  21  21  17  18  1250 -1500  43  23  23  18  18  1500 -2000  45  24  24  19  18  2000 -2500  49  24  24  20  18  2500 -3000  53  26  26  21  18  3000 -10000  55  32  30  27  18  10000 -15000  55  32  30  21  18  1500 -20000  55  32  30  21  18  20000 -30000  55  30  30  19  18 Source: see text. 
